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Abstract 
The UK’s Financial Services Authority sets individual capital requirements that reflect its 
assessment of risks and that are greater than the 8% minimum required by Basel. This 
approach is similar to the supervisory review in Pillar II proposed in the new Basel Accord. 
Using regulatory returns for UK banks and building societies, we empirically assess how 
changing a firm’s individual capital requirement affects its capital ratio. We find that banks 
faced with an increase in capital requirements transfer nearly 50% of the increase into 
changes in their capital holdings, but only 20% if they face a reduction. The results are 
different for building societies, where about 20% of either an increase or a decrease in capital 
requirements is transferred into capital ratios. 
 
Words: 5294. 
Key words:  Banks, building societies, capital requirements. 
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1 Introduction 
The UK’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) sets individual capital requirements for UK 
banks1 and building societies2 in excess of the current Basel minimum of 8%. Most banks 
and building societies hold considerably more capital than required by the FSA. This might 
lead one to assume that changes in capital requirements do not affect the amount of capital 
held, as the changes will be fully absorbed by this excess or buffer. 
 
There is a growing empirical literature on the determinants of banks’ capital buffers. 
It includes Furfine (2000) for US banks, Rime (2000) for Swiss banks, Kleff and Weber (2003) 
for German banks, Ayuso et al. (2004) for Spanish banks, and Lindquist (2004) for Norwegian 
banks. These papers focus on the capital buffers over the Basel minimum because the 
regulators do not set individual capital requirements like in the UK. However, the buffer over 
individual capital requirements in the UK might not be a decision variable and be just residual. 
 
We analyse the determinants of UK firms’ capital ratios. Following Alfon et al. (2004) 
we assume that firms’ capital ratios could be influenced by firms’ internal factors (e.g. the risk 
preferences of managers), by market discipline exerted by shareholders and bondholders and 
by the regulatory framework.3 
 
Our research gathers evidence on the role of the FSA’s individual capital 
requirements in determining the capital ratios of UK banks and building societies. In particular 
we analyse empirically whether and how capital ratios are affected by individual capital 
requirements.4 Ediz et al. (1998), exploring UK banks’ reactions to regulatory pressure, found 
evidence that banks boost their capital ratios as soon as they fall to a certain level above the 
regulatory minimum. Here, we quantify the impact of having individual capital requirements, 
an arrangement that will be extended to most banks operating in countries that adopt the 
new Basel Accord. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out aspects of the UK framework 
for individual capital requirements. Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents our 
empirical model. Section 5 summarises the estimation approach and discusses the results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                                          
1. The term UK bank is used here as a bank that both operates in the UK and is incorporated in the UK. We therefore 
exclude UK branches of foreign banks. 
2. A building society is a mutual organisation whose main activity is mortgage lending for house purchase, financed 
mainly but not exclusively by taking deposits from retail customers. 
3. See Alfon et al. (2004a) for a review of these factors and Alfon et al. (2004b) for a summarised qualitative analysis of 
the factors’ relevance for UK banks and building societies, based on interviews. 
4. Banks and building societies also accumulate provisions against loan default. These provisions protect against 
expected losses and are likely to vary over time, Pain (2003). Provisions are therefore different from capital, which should 
provide a buffer against unexpected losses. Decisions about provisions and capital are unlikely to be independent. For 
example, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) explore the relationship between capital and provisions and find that banks tend to 
delay provisioning for bad loans, thereby possibly magnifying the economic cycle’s impact on capital. Further research 
may be needed to explore the relationship between capital and provisions in the UK. 
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2 Framework for capital requirements in the UK  
A regulator may set a capital requirement with the explicit intention that banks always operate 
with a higher capital ratio. In fact, this is the intention behind the 8% ratio of the current Basel 
Accord, BCBS (1999). In the UK, the regulator sets individual capital requirements in excess 
of the 8% as minima with the expectation that firms will always exceed even them. 
 
The FSA inherited from the Bank of England the practice of setting two separate 
capital requirements for each bank: a ‘trigger ratio’ and a higher ‘target ratio’. The trigger ratio 
was a minimum capital ratio for the bank that would trigger regulatory intervention if 
breached. The target ratio was to act as a warning light and as a cushion of capital to help 
prevent an accidental breach of the trigger ratio. For building societies, the Building Societies 
Commission set ‘threshold ratios’ that corresponded to banks’ trigger ratios. 
 
Following the Financial Services and Markets Act, which came into force in 2001, 
the FSA stopped setting target ratios for banks and said that it would “consider it to be good 
management practice in the financial services industry for a UK bank to hold an appropriate 
capital buffer above the individual capital ratio advised by the FSA”, FSA (2001). At the same 
time, the FSA published details about the factors that it would take into account when setting 
banks’ individual capital requirements, risk being the main factor, FSA (2001). The FSA also 
announced that it was reviewing banks’ individual capital requirements to make them 
consistent with the new framework. A similar review took place for building societies. 
 
Three broad characteristics underlie the UK regulatory system for banks 
and building societies throughout the period analysed: individual capital requirements 
are set at firm-specific level; the FSA may at any time vary a firm’s requirement; and 
individual capital requirements exceed the Basel minimum of 8% for all banks and building 
societies. The “FSA considers that the basic 8% regulatory minimum capital requirement is 
only appropriate for a well-diversified firm whose business, management, systems and 
controls are strong and where the risks that it is exposed to are captured adequately by the 
existing capital model”, FSA (2001). In fact, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 
BCBS (1999), recognised as weaknesses of the current system its poor risk sensitivity, its 
difficulty in covering all risks and its inability to provide the right incentives for good risk 
management practices.5 These views are shared by many analysts, for example, Milne (2001) 
and Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001). 
 
                                                                          
5. BCBS (1999) also acknowledged that the requirements mostly deal with credit and market risks: “While the original 
Accord focused mainly on credit risk, it has since been amended to address market risk. Interest rate risk in the banking 
book and other risks, such as operational, liquidity, legal and reputational risks, are not explicitly addressed. Implicitly, 
however, the present Accord takes account of such risks by setting a minimum ratio that has an acknowledged buffer to 
cover unquantified risks.” 
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3 Data used 
We use data from the prudential returns submitted to the FSA by building societies and UK 
banks. For building societies we use quarterly data from the second quarter of 1997 to the 
second quarter of 2002, constituting a balanced panel dataset.6 For banks we use quarterly 
data from the third quarter of 1998 to the third quarter of 2002. Banks report at different 
months. In some cases their reporting pattern is not regular and some have changed it during 
the period analysed. It is therefore an unbalanced panel dataset that in most cases does not 
contain information about income and expenditure (profit and loss account data).7 
 
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the main statistics of the variables used in analysing 
building societies and banks respectively. A comparison of the tables shows much higher 
unweighted average capital ratios and regulatory capital requirements for banks than for 
building societies. 
 
The tables also show that, with the exception of the building society proxy for the 
return on equity, all variables show more dispersion across firms than within a given firm over 
time.8 In many instances, the differences among firms are four times larger than the 
differences over time for a given firm. The dispersion is greater for actual capital ratios than for 
required regulatory ratios, suggesting that the market discipline and management preferences 
differentiate more between firms than the regulator. Dispersion in capital ratios is much lower 
for building societies than for banks, which could indicate that the former are more 
homogeneous. 
 
Table 3 summarises some statistics where the data are weighted by size. We use 
two measures of size: 1) total assets and 2) risk-weighted assets, with the weights used in 
the current Accord. The table shows that, weighted by total assets, the average capital ratio 
for banks is nearly 50% above the average individual capital requirements set by the FSA 
(35% if weighted by risk-weighted assets). This rises to over 85% for banks without trading 
book activity (40% if weighted by risk-weighted assets).9 It must be taken into account that 
banks that have a trading book are larger than the average bank and most of them have 
a non-UK parent. On the other hand, building societies hold a weighted average about 31% 
more than individually required. Building societies’ weighted average buffer (i.e. capital minus 
individual capital required, as a percentage of individual capital required) is below that for 
banks. The weighted averages of actual capital ratios and buffers are much lower than the 
unweighted averages, indicating that larger firms tend to have lower capital ratios and smaller 
buffers. 
 
As Figure 1 shows, over the period banks increased their buffer. Building societies 
maintained theirs at a steady level. The differences in capital ratios amongst banks have 
reduced in the same period. The pattern for building societies seems to be the contrary, as 
the dispersion has increased, especially since 2000.10 
 
                                                                          
6. These returns include both capital statements and the income and expenditure account. 
7. We have excluded observations of banks where the capital ratio or the capital requirement is missing, 
where the capital ratio is shown as exceeding 500% of risk-weighted assets, or where more than 100% is obtained for 
the proportion of total assets that attract a 100% risk-weight or the proportion of commercial and retail deposits to total 
deposits. We have also excluded two observations with capital ratios at or below the required minimum level, as these 
banks would have been subject to intervention by the supervisory authorities. 
8. The mean of the ROE for the minority of banks for which data are available is 6.88%. 
9. The trading book consists of securities, foreign exchange, commodities positions, and derivatives that are held for a 
short term trading purpose. 
10. The coefficient of variation (CV) of banks’ individual capital requirements in 1998 was 0.59. It dropped to 0.42 at 
the end of 2000 and 0.27 in 2002. For building societies, the CV shows the reverse pattern: from 0.04 in 1997 to 0.08 
in 2002. 
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4 Empirical model 
The framework used to explore the effect of individual capital requirements on actual capital is 
based on Ayuso et al. (2004) and Lindquist (2004), which analyse the buffer capital of Spanish 
and Norwegian banks respectively. 
 
We specify the model in terms of actual capital ratios.11 The most general 
specification of our model can be represented as: 
 
1it i it it it it it it it it i itK A KREQ RISK SIZE GGDP DEP PEER Z K
α β δ γ τ λ ξ µ η ε−=  (1) 
 
where Kit is the total capital held by firm i at time t as a ratio of risk-weighted assets, and A is 
a constant. 
 
KREQ is the individual capital requirement set by the FSA (a ratio of capital 
to risk-weighted assets).12 If banks and building societies react to the individual capital 
requirements α should be positive and statistically significant.13 A theoretical approach that 
links the probability of regulatory intervention and a bank’s level of capital, can be found in 
Milne (2000). 
 
The variable RISK is an ex-post measure of risk, calculated as the proportion of a 
firm’s total assets that are assigned the highest risk (i.e. those with a 100% risk-weight).14 
A statistically significant β coefficient could be interpreted as evidence that firms assess risk 
differently from regulators. A positive coefficient would suggest that increases in the risk of 
the portfolio are associated with capital increases beyond those required by the heavier 
regulatory weight given to those assets. This would suggest that firms assign an even 
larger risk to these assets than the regulator; a negative coefficient would be compatible 
with either the presence of moral hazard behaviour in firms or the possibility that firms with 
riskier assets also have better quality risk management mechanisms, so that they can hold 
less capital than less sophisticated firms with the same risk. 
 
SIZE is measured by total assets. Most hypotheses suggest a negative relationship 
between size and capital ratio. It could be argued that screening and monitoring to reduce the 
asymmetric information between lender and borrower generate costs some of which can 
present economies of scale. We also expect a negative relationship between capital ratio and 
size, because of diversification benefits that can arise with a large portfolio. Moreover, 
according to the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis, the largest institutions could be holding less 
capital since they expect that in the event of a problem they will receive support from the 
                                                                          
11. As explained earlier, Ayuso et al. (2004) and Lindquist (2004) used the buffer over the Basel minimum as the 
explanatory variable because regulators in Spain and Norway do not set individual capital requirements. We have also 
estimated our model with the buffer over individual capital requirement as the dependent variable. The results are 
similar to those presented here: there is inertia or adjustment costs; risk, size, quality of capital and growth have a 
negative impact on the buffer; non-wholesale deposits and peer pressure have a positive effect (although the latter is not 
statistically significant). 
12. We use the trigger ratio and the individual capital requirements for banks and the threshold ratio for building societies 
as the measure of regulatory requirements. 
13. We carry out a Granger causality test to assess the hypothesis that changes in individual capital requirements 
precede changes in actual capital and not the other way round. We carry out the test, using a random-effects (within) 
estimator. When we regress banks’ individual capital requirements on the lagged variables, the p-value of the lagged 
actual capital ratio is 0.33 (0.64 in the within estimation). When we regress banks’ actual capital on the lagged variables, 
the p-value for the lagged individual capital ratio is 0.03 (0.43 in the within estimation). Therefore there is some evidence 
that the changes in individual capital requirements precede changes in levels of actual capital. 
14. The data suggests that the largest firms seem to be holding the lowest proportion of risky assets. For example, 
on average, 25.6% of the assets of the largest banks are 100% risk-weighted whereas the smallest banks have, on 
average, 38.5%. 
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regulator. A negative relationship would also result if small firms had more difficulties 
accessing capital markets when faced with stressful situations and preferred to hold a higher 
level of capital overall than large firms did. Small firms could have proportionally larger 
adjustment costs. A negative relationship between size and capital ratio could also support 
the hypothesis of market signalling, whereby small firms might use their capital as a 
mechanism to show the market their soundness or their prudence. It could also support the 
hypothesis that small firms need slack to finance their long-term strategies. 
 
Economic conditions may also affect the overall level of capital, see Borio 
et al. (2001). GGDP  tries to capture the role of the cycle and is measured as the real annual 
GDP growth rate by quarter. We expect that in a downturn, when risks are more likely to 
materialise, actual capital ratios may decrease as a result of write-offs and because of 
increases in specific provisions. Moreover, the default probabilities of loans and the value 
of collateral could be highly correlated, since when the market turns down many participants 
might want to sell assets at the same time. A macroeconomic downturn will lead to a 
deterioration in ratings and hence to additional demands on capital for those firms using 
ratings to assess their loans’ risks and to decide on capital. In an upturn, risk reduces and 
firms can safely hold less capital than in a downturn. If actual capital is pro-cyclical, we expect 
the coefficient of GGDP  to have a negative sign. 
 
For each period t and firm i, the variable PEER is the average capital ratio of all firms, 
except firm i, that report at time t and that are of similar size to firm i.15 It tries to capture peer 
pressure as its existence could imply that there is a kind of herd effect.16 If this effect exists, 
we would expect the coefficient of PEER  to be positive. 
 
DEP  is the proportion of commercial and retail deposits (i.e. non-interbank deposits) 
over total deposits. Only retail deposits up to certain limits fall within the scope of deposit 
compensation scheme so this variable is included to capture the relevance of 
deposit insurance. For example, Nier and Bauman (2003) find that a higher share of uninsured 
funding leads banks to choose a larger capital buffer for a given risk, so the larger the amount 
of insured funding, the weaker the market discipline could be. A negative coefficient of 
DEP could be regarded as evidence of moral hazard behaviour by firms. 
 
Other variables, denoted generically as Z , have also been included in the estimation 
depending on their availability and relevance. For building societies, return on equity, ROE , is 
included as a proxy for the cost of capital. It is measured as the proportion of profits over 
capital. We expect the sign of the coefficient to be negative. As already mentioned, this 
variable could not be constructed for most banks as their returns do not include the relevant 
data. 
 
For banks, we include as part of Z  the variable TRADE  as a proxy for the amount 
of trading book activity. It is measured as the proportion of the trading book’s notional 
risk-weighted assets over total risk-weighted assets. It is included as it could be argued that 
the risk associated with these activities could have different implications for capital than does 
credit risk. The variable could capture business differences associated with trading activities in 
the firms' overall portfolio.17 We also include FOREIGN. This is a trend dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the country of origin of the bank’s parent is the UK and 0 otherwise. 
                                                                          
15. Firms are grouped by quartile. 
16. Lindquist (2004) proposes a similar measure, although not grouping firms by size. 
17. The average proportion of assets in the trading book was 2.3% for UK-owned banks, 13.3% for other EU-owned 
banks, 17.1% for US-owned banks and 12.2% for other foreign banks. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0515 
The hypothesis that there are adjustment costs in attaining the desired level of capital 
is captured by the inclusion of the dependent variable lagged one period. 
 
Finally, ηi is an unobservable variable that captures the idiosyncratic features 
of each firm that are constant over time but vary from firm to firm. These could cover 
management’s aversion to regulatory risk, management’s strategy for new business 
opportunities and management’s freedom from shareholders. εit is a random shock. 
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5 Estimation and empirical results 
In order to carry out the estimation, we re-specify equation 1 in logs, so that it becomes: 
 
itiitit
itittititititit
kz
peerdepggdpsizeriskkreqak
εηµξ
λτγδβα
++++
++++++=
−1
 (2) 
 
 
where the lower case names indicate all variables are in logs. 
 
We treat risk, dep, trade and roe as endogenous. As the lagged endogenous 
variable is included among the regressors, we transform the equation into first differences 
and estimate it with a GMM estimator. We use as instruments the lagged levels of the 
dependent variable and of the endogenous variables (second, third and fourth lags), and 
the lagged differences of the exogenous variables. We report the estimated coefficients 
and robust standard errors from the robust first-step estimators. We also report the Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions and autocorrelation tests of first and second order.18 
 
Table 4 presents the results from the dataset for building societies. Column 1 reports 
the results for the whole sample. Columns 2 and 3 report the results for building societies that 
have experienced an increase or decrease respectively in their individual capital requirements. 
The last column shows the results for building societies with buffers in the lowest quartile. 
 
Table 5 shows the results for banks. Column 1 shows the results for the whole 
sample. Column 2 shows the results for banks with a trading book. Columns 3 and 4 show 
the results for banks that have experienced an increase and a decrease respectively in their 
individual capital requirements. 33 banks have experienced both increases and decreases in 
their requirements during the period considered and are therefore included in both columns. 
Column 5 shows the results for banks with the lowest buffers (those in the lowest quartile). 
 
None of the estimated equations in Tables 4 and 5 can reject the Sargan test 
of over-identifying restrictions. They all show the adequate properties in the face of 
autocorrelation: they show first order autocorrelation but the hypothesis of no second order 
autocorrelation can not be rejected in all cases. 
 
We find that size has a negative effect on capital, so the larger the firm the lower its 
capital ratio. This negative relationship could be consistent with any of the hypotheses 
discussed above under “size”. The current specification does not allow for a unique 
interpretation. 
 
The relationship between capital ratios and the proposed measure of ex-post risk is 
estimated to be negative, so the higher the risk appetite of a firm, the less capital it holds. 
Evidence of a negative risk effect is also obtained in Ayuso et al. (2004) and Lindquist (2004). 
This result could support the hypothesis that there is moral hazard in firms’ behaviour. 
However, this interpretation is not consistent with the positive relationship estimated between 
capital and the ratio of partially insured deposits over total deposits plus capital holdings. 
                                                                          
18. Using data on first differences, we should observe first order autocorrelation and no second order autocorrelation. 
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It could be argued that firms with riskier assets also have better quality systems and controls 
allowing them to be comfortable with less capital for a given risk.19 
 
We find a negative and significant relationship between the economic cycle and the 
capital ratio for banks. The results are consistent with those reported in Ayuso et al. (2004) for 
buffers of Spanish banks. Not surprisingly, for building societies the results are less clear: the 
estimated coefficient is negative but not significant. We also find evidence that peer pressure 
affects the capital ratio of all types of firm considered, although the coefficient is not very high. 
This is broadly consistent with Lindquist (2004). This suggests that firms may be using the 
capital ratio as a signalling device. 
 
For banks with a trading book, we estimate a negative relationship between the 
value of assets in the trading book and the capital ratio. Again it could suggest that firms with 
a trading book value risks differently from firms without, perhaps because assets in the 
trading book are more liquid than in the banking book. 
 
The coefficient of the cost of capital for building societies is estimated to be 
positive and statistically significant –a result which is difficult to interpret–. However, when 
we exclude the lagged capital ratio (a proxy for adjustment costs), we find a weak and 
negative relationship between roe and capital ratio.20 A possible explanation is that profits are 
the main source of capital for building societies, so that the proxy used in the estimation for 
the cost of capital is not appropriate. For the banks that include profit and loss data in their 
returns, the estimated coefficient of the return on equity is positive and not statistically 
significant. The role of the cost of capital and the need to find a meaningful proxy for it need 
to be explored further. 
 
We might also expect that firms whose actual capital ratio is closer to their individual 
capital requirement would react more strongly to changes in capital requirements, because 
of the greater risk of breaching the requirement, Ediz et al. (1998). To test this hypothesis, 
we estimate the equation for groups of firms defined according to their buffer. For the lowest 
quartile, we find that the estimated coefficient is higher for banks and building societies with 
low buffers than for the average bank. In other words, firms with small buffers react more to a 
given change in individual capital requirements.21 The estimated coefficient for banks with low 
buffers is higher than the coefficient for building societies with low buffers. This suggests that 
the banks with the lowest buffers react more than building societies with the lowest buffers to 
changes to individual capital requirements. 
 
For both building societies and banks we obtain a significant and positive 
relationship between individual capital requirements and actual capital ratios, indicating 
that the higher the required individual capital ratio the higher the actual capital ratio. The 
short term coefficients range from 0.28 for all banks to 0.43 for banks engaged in trading 
activities. The long term coefficients are 0.41 and 0.61 respectively. For building societies the 
short term coefficient is 0.18 and the long term one is 0.29. So there is never a one-to-one 
response. These figures suggest that, in general, much less than 50% of changes in individual 
capital requirements are translated into changes in the capital ratio. In other words, the buffer 
tends to absorb most of any change in the requirements. 
                                                                          
19. Rather similar results were obtained when we proxied risk by the ratio of Tier one capital over total eligible capital and 
when we used other definitions of risks such as the ratio of highest risk assets over risk-weighted assets, the proportion 
of assets weighted at 50% or proportion of risk-weighted assets to total assets. 
20. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 20% level of confidence. 
21. In general terms, firms with a large buffer do not seem to react to changes in the required capital: the coefficient of 
individual capital requirement is either not statistically significant or much lower than for firms whose capital is closer to 
the regulator’s requirement. 
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In order to assess the robustness of these results we test for asymmetric 
responses to changes in capital requirements. When the sample is split between firms that 
have experienced an increase in their required capital ratio during the period analysed and 
firms that have experienced a decrease, the results show different responses to changes. In 
particular, banks that have experienced an increase in their requirements raise their actual 
capital ratio by 50% of the increase in the requirement in the short term and by nearly 71% in 
the long term. For banks that have experienced a decrease, the adjustment is around 20%. 
This result seems to suggest that banks are more concerned with the possibility of regulatory 
breach than with the additional costs associated with holding excess capital.22 Building 
societies react similarly to increases and reductions in regulatory capital requirements. Under 
both circumstances the buffer absorbs 80% of the change and the building society changes 
its capital holdings by 20%. 
 
                                                                          
22. The lack of statistical significance of roe mentioned earlier could support such an interpretation. However, as already 
pointed out, the results obtained for roe must be treated with caution. 
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6 Conclusions  
Our main finding is that, although firms have a buffer over individual capital 
requirements, changes in the individual capital requirements are very likely to be accompanied 
by some response in the capital ratio. For example, if a bank (building society) which is 
holding capital at 15% of risk-weighted assets has its individual required capital ratio 
increased from 10% to 11%, it would on average increase its actual capital ratio at least 
to 15.4%. 
 
The evidence shows that firms operating close to their individual capital requirement 
are more sensitive to changes in regulatory capital than firms with a large buffer. As the firms 
with smaller buffers are generally large banks, it could be argued that changes in individual 
capital requirements will affect them more than they will affect smaller banks. The firm’s 
degree of risk aversion will influence the final impact as firms with riskier assets seem to hold 
less capital. 
 
The implementation of the new Basel Accord will change the relationship between 
regulatory capital requirements and the capital held by firms. Since regulatory capital will rely 
more heavily on internal models devised by firms to set their desired capital, the link between 
capital requirements and actual capital may be reinforced. This requires further research. 
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Figure 1.  Unweighted average buffer over 
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TABLE 1.  Summary statistics about building societies(1) 
 
 Mean 
Overall 
standard 
deviation 
Standard 
deviation 
over time 
Standard 
deviation 
within firms 
Actual capital (% of risk-weighted 
assets; K)  15.16  4.11  4.05  0.88 
Capital requirements 
(% of risk-weighted assets; KREQ)  9.65  0.50  0.40  0.30 
Tier 1 capital (% of total capital)  95.45  6.89  6.52  2.37 
Buffer (% in excess of capital 
requirement)  56.92  40.51  39.70  9.39 
Buffer (difference between actual 
capital and capital requirement in 
percentage points)  5.50  4.02  3.96  0.87 
Size (£m of assets; SIZE) 2229.00  7947.40  7859.90  1513.10 
Riskiness (% of total assets 
attracting a 100% risk-weight; 
RISK)  6.88  4.18  3.75  1.89 
Return on equity (%; ROE)  6.83  4.52  2.55  3.75 
Observations: 1365 
Firms: 65 
 
(1) Quarterly data; unweighted; second quarter 1997 to second quarter 2002. 
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TABLE 2.  Summary statistics about banks(1) 
 
 Mean 
Overall 
standard 
deviation 
Standard 
deviation 
over time 
Standard 
deviation 
within firms 
Actual capital (% of risk-weighted 
assets; K)  41.45  61.01  61.44  22.60 
Capital requirements 
(% of risk-weighted assets; KREQ)  12.78  5.90  5.21  3.33 
Tier 1 capital (% of total capital)  87.28  14.89  13.89  5.87 
Buffer (% in excess of capital 
requirement)  234.52  558.38  546.15  223.14 
Buffer (difference between actual 
capital and capital requirement in 
percentage points)  28.67  59.67  60.02  22.81 
Size (£m of assets; SIZE)  14536.50  46452.24  42617.70 11559.41 
Riskiness (% of total assets 
attracting a 100% risk-weight; 
RISK)  30.82  26.22  24.69  9.29 
Proportion of commercial and 
retail deposits (% of all deposits; 
DEP)  63.04  35.00  32.72  13.14 
Proportion of assets in the trading 
book (%; TRADE)  7.55  20.08  18.62  6.04 
Observations: 2744 
Firms (foreign): 187 (92) 
 
(1) Quarterly data; unweighted; third quarter 1998 to third quarter 2002. 
 
  
TABLE 3.  Additional data for banks (1998-2002) and building societies (1997-2002) 
 
  Average 
capital 
requirements 
 
% of 
risk-weighted 
assets 
Average actual 
capital 
 
 
% of 
risk-weighted 
assets 
Average buffer 
 
 
 
% of 
capital 
requirement 
Proportion of 
assets in 
trading book 
 
% of 
risk-weighted 
assets 
Proportion of 
tier 1 capital 
 
 
% of 
total capital 
Average  
size 
 
 
£ billion  
of assets 
 
Unweighted  12.78  41.45  234.52  7.55 87.28 
Weighted by total assets  9.42  14.16  48.06  9.83 84.78 All banks 
Weighted by 
risk-weighted assets  9.42  12.92  35.03  8.61 95.14 
14.54 
Unweighted  10.97  30.24  177.67  22.80 83.15 
Weighted by total assets  9.20  12.71  36.38  12.79 84.21 
Banks with 
trading book 
activity Weighted by 
risk-weighted assets  9.24  12.49  33.82  11.23 97.04 
33.74 
Unweighted  13.68  47.00  262.68 0 89.61 
Weighted by total assets  10.15  18.99  86.95 0 86.79 
Banks without 
trading book 
activity Weighted by 
risk-weighted aassets  10.01  14.33  39.03 0 88.88 
5.02 
Unweighted  9.65  15.16  56.92 n/a 95.45 
Weighted by total assets  9.45  12.40  31.13 n/a 90.32 Building 
societies 
Weighted by 
risk-weighted assets  9.43  12.33  30.76 n/a 90.56 
2.23 
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TABLE 4.  Determinants of building societies’ capital ratios(1) 
 
Variable  All sample 
Firms that 
experienced an 
increase in 
capital 
requirements 
Firms that 
experienced a 
decrease in 
capital 
requirements 
Firms with a 
low buffer (2) 
kreq  0.18 (0.07)**  0.22 (0.10)**  0.21 (0.10)**  0.29 (0.14)** 
size  -0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03)**  0.01 (0.01)  -0.08 (0.04)** 
risk  -0.04 (0.01)** -0.05 (0.01)** -0.04 (0.01)**  -0.01 (0.02) 
ggdp  -0.002 (0.005) -0.003 (0.007) -0.004 (0.006)  -0.01 (0.009) 
peer  0.16 (0.06)**  0.17 (0.09)**  0.04 (0.08)  0.17 (0.13) 
roe  0.01 (0.004)** – – – 
kt-1  0.48 (0.06)**  0.39 (0.06)**  0.63 (0.12)**  0.34 (0.09)** 
kt-2  -0.10 (0.04)** -0.10 (0.04)**   
Sargan test(3)  1.00 (291)  1.00 (239)  1.00 (242)  1.00 (242) 
H0 = No 1st order 
autocorrelation 
Prob > z  0.000  0.0004 0.13 0.03 
H0 = No 2nd order 
autocorrelation 
Prob > z  0.87  0.93 0.80 0.55 
Number of 
observations  1162  954  304 305 
Number of firms  65  53  16  33 
 
(1) Quarterly data from second quarter 1997 to second quarter 2002. First difference regressions. 
First-step robust standard errors in brackets. All equations include quarterly dummies. Risk, dep, roe, kt-1 
and kt-2 have been instrumented with their 2nd ,3rd and 4th  lags and the lagged differences of the 
exogenous variables. 
(2) Includes only observations corresponding to a buffer lower than 30.5%, which corresponds to the 
lowest quarterile of the population. 
(3) Prob > χ2 (degrees of freedom). 
(**) Statistically significant at 5%. 
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TABLE 5.  Determinants of banks’ capital ratios(1) 
 
Variable  All sample 
Firms with 
trading book 
Firms that have 
experienced an 
increase in 
capital 
requirements 
Firms that have 
experienced a 
decrease in 
capital 
requirements 
Firms with a 
low buffer(2) 
kreq 0.28 (0.14)** 0.43 (0.23)* 0.49 (0.23) ** 0.19 (0.10)** 0.41 (0.15)** 
size -0.23 (0.06) ** -0.38 (0.07)** -0.25 (0.04)** -0.26 (0.06)** -0.13 (0.06)** 
risk -0.22 (0.07)** -0.23 (0.05)** -0.17 (0.04) ** -0.25 (0.07)** -0.12 (0.06)** 
ggdp -0.04 (0.02)** -0.11 (0.04)** -0.08 (0.04)** -0.01 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02)** 
peer 0.07 (0.02)** 0.06 (0.03)* 0.08 (0.03)** 0.06 (0.03)** 0.01 (0.01) 
dep 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)* -0.03 (0.03) -0.02 (0.06) 
trade - -0.06 (0.03)** - - - 
foreign 0.005 (0.005) 0.008 (0.007) -0.002 (0.007) 0.01 (0.007)* 0.0005(0.006) 
kt-1 0.32 (0.09)** 0.30 (0.06)** 0.31 (0.07)** 0.24 (0.05)** 0.22 (0.07)** 
Const 0.007 (0.003)** 0.006 (0.006) 0.01 (0.005)* 0.006 (0.004) -0.02 (0.004)** 
Sargan test(3) 0.93 (201) 1.00 (242) 1.00 (201) 1.00 (201) 1.00 (190) 
H0 = No 1st order 
autocorrelation 
Prob > z 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.0004 0.05 
H0 = No 2nd  order 
autocorrelation 
Prob > z  0.92 0.99 0.75 0.78 0.47 
Number of 
observations 2052 646 821 1180 403 
Number of firms 182 59 72 97 76 
 
(1) Quarterly data from second quarter 1997 to second quarter 2002. First difference regressions. 
First-step robust standard errors in brackets. All equations include quarterly dummies. Risk, dep, roe 
have been instrumented with their 2nd ,3rd and 4th  lags and the lagged differences of the exogenous 
variables. 
(2) Includes only observations corresponding to a buffer lower than 30.5%, which corresponds to the 
lowest quarterile of the population. 
(3) Prob > χ2 (degrees of freedom). 
(*) Statistically significant at 10%. 
(**) Statistically significant at 5%. 
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